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Introduction 
Substantial extension of the human lifespan has become a subject of lively 
debate. One reason for this is the completion of the Human Genome Proj­
ect in 2001 and the experimental avenues for biogerontological research 
the project enables. Another is recent theoretical progress in biogerontol­
ogy (Austad 1997; Hayflick 1994; Holliday 1995; Kirkwood 1999; Ricklefs 
& Finch 1995). The character of modern culture is at least as important a 
factor in explaining why life extension intervention is currently debated. 
Three existential factors that playa role here are fear of death (fear of no 
longer existing), fear of the suffering involved in the process of dying, and 
the sometimes obsessive desire to preserve good health in order to pursue 
personal life projects and goals (Turner 2004). The historical background 
of this motivational pattern is 'the decline since the Renaissance of faith in 
supernatural salvation from death; concern with the worth of individual 
identity and experience shifted from an otherworldly realm to the "here 
and now'; with intensification of earthly expectations' (G.J. Gruman quot­
ed in Post 2004a, 82, see also Baumeister 1991, 77-115). 
There is a lot of interest in substantial life extension, but would it really 
be a good thing? Experience with other revolutionary technologies shows 
us that once they exist, they can no longer be stopped. Too much has been 
invested in them: once research has produced an effective technology ca­
tering to all-too-human desires, there is seldom a way back. So we had 
better investigate the worldview aspects of considerable human lifespan 
extension now, before this extension has become genuinely practicable, 
or, before large sums of money have been spent on it. 
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In this article I will first consider what 'substantial life extension' and Not long ago three officials of the World Health Organization wrote that 
a 'meaningful life' means. After that I will deal with some arguments and t Fries's tenets and vision 'now lie at the heart of today's approach to NCDs 
considerations concerning the relationship between the two. 
Substantial Extension of Human Lifespan:
 
What Are We Talking About?
 
Before embarking on a discussion about the meaning of 'substantial exten­
sion of human lifespan; it has to be clear what we mean by it. We can dis­
tinguish between four possible outcomes of a biotechnological enhance­
ment of the human lifespan. Drawing on work by Harry Moody (1995) and 
Eric Juengst and others (Juengst et al. 2003) we can name these extended 
morbidity, compressed morbidity, decelerated senescence, and arrested 
senescence. 
Extended morbidity means that the average human life becomes longer 
because the period of (co)morbidity at the end is lengthened. Through 
good hygiene, nutrition, education, housing, medical care, welfare ar­
rangements, and social services, old people with one or more chronic dis­
eases stay alive longer. This means that average life expectancy increases, 
but this need not be an increase in human flourishing or a cause for joy. 
Extended or prolonged morbidity does not imply an increase in maximum 
human life expectancy. A typical time structure for a human life with ex­
tended morbidity could be: growing up from 0 to 20, adult health span 20 
to 55, period of growing morbidity up to 95 as the average age at death and 
with an unchanged maximum of around 120. Some scientists (Baltes 2003) 
fear extended morbidity as the most likely scenario, with Alzheimer's dis­
ease as one of the main threats. Since nobody wishes it to become reality, 
we shall not discuss the desirability of this type of life extension here. 
Compressed morbidity is a scenario in which the onset of serious age­
associated maladies, the infirmities at the end of life, is delayed as long as 
possible and thus these are compressed into a shorter period. The maxi­
mum human lifespan of around 120 is accepted as fixed. The focus of 
compressed morbidity is that the average human health-span is extended 
to a much longer period from 20 up to 'the ideal average lifespan, ap­
proximately 85 years' (Fries 1980, 130), followed by a relatively short pe­
riod of decline before death, a period of one or two years at the most. The 
feasibility of compression of morbidity for the life stage between 55 and 
85 was first argued for by James Fries in 1980 and it has been embraced 
by many, for example the biogerontologist Robert Arking (Arking 2004). 
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[non-communicable diseases], ageing and health with its focus on the life 
course, health promotion, and "active ageing" [use it or lose it]' (Kalache, 
Aboderin & Hoskins 2002). Because its original assumption is that the 
maximum human lifespan is biologically predetermined at around 120 
and that death at an average age of 85 is 'natural' and even 'ideal; com­
pression of morbidity is not a form of substantial life extension. It has to 
be noted, however, that several gerontologists think that compression of 
morbidity is actually impossible. They think it is highly unlikely that we 
will be able to increase the health-span without simultaneously increas­
ing the lifespan and the period of morbidity at the end (Neugarten 1996). 
Compression of morbidity would then be practically the same as delayed 
or decelerated senescence. 
In decelerated senescence the processes of biological ageing are slowed 
down, resulting in a higher average life expectancy and probably a higher 
maximum life expectancy. Decelerated senescence means that the period 
of good health in a human life is extended (as in the scenario of com­
pressed morbidity), but the period of morbidity remains the same or is 
lengthened as well (as in extended morbidity). The average pattern of a 
human life in this case could be: growing up 0-20, adult health-span 20­
90, and period of decline after that with death at an age of about 110. 
Maximum life expectancy at birth might be 140 years. Richard Miller is a 
respected biogerontologist who thinks that such a decelerated senescence 
is the most likely development. 'Nature can slow down aging, and so, it 
turns out, can we. There are so far two approaches that work for sure: 
diminished total caloric intake and changes in genes that regulate the rate 
of early-life growth' (Miller 2004, 233). A recent and clear manifestation 
of the idea of decelerated senescence can be found in an article by Jay 
Olshansky and others, including Miller. They can be regarded as repre­
sentatives of a growing chorus of scientists calling themselves 'moderate; 
'modest; and 'realistic: They firmly believe that a current investment of 
3 billion US dollars annually will make it possible to decelerate ageing 
and to delay the onset of ageing-related diseases and disorders among the 
baby boom cohorts by seven years. 
People who reach the age of 50 in the future would have the health pro­
file and disease risk of today's 43-year old; those aged 60 would resem­
ble current 53-year-olds, and so on. Equally important, once achieved, 
this seven-year delay would yield equal health and longevity benefits for 
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all subsequent generations, much the same way children born in most 
nations today benefit from the discovery and development of immuni­
zations (Olshansky et al. 2006, 32). 
Arrested senescence refers to relatively complete control of the biologi­
cal processes of senescence. In this scenario, ageing in the sense of se­
nescence or physical and mental deterioration does not occur anymore, 
or the human organism is cared for very well (maintenance) and the se­
nescence that occurs is periodically repaired by a rejuvenation cure. For 
decades, or centuries, the chance (probability) of dying does not increase 
with age anymore, but stays rather constant. People still die, but they no 
longer die from the slow accumulation of damage and chronic deteriora­
tion. Instead they die from accidents, murder, or war. In this scenario 
people can become very old. Average life expectancies of 150, 500 or even 
5000 years are thought to be possible. Talking about engineering arrested 
senescence may sound as if we have entered the field of quackery, pseudo­
science, or science fiction. However, one of the strongest defenders of the 
scientific credibility of Strategies for Engineering Negligible Senescence 
(SENS), Aubrey de Grey (De Grey 2003; 2005; De Grey et al. 2002), force­
fully argues that humanity needs to set aside massive sums of money for 
a War on Aging. He has also, together with relevant specialists, outlined 
and embarked on detailing a set of biotechnological measures we could 
use to beat the 'seven deadly things' that accumulate with age as side ef­
fects of metabolism. According to De Grey these seven problems together 
constitute the core of aging. The seven categories of damage to be solved 
are: 1. cell death without matching replacement (especially important in 
the heart and the brain); 2. unwanted cells, e.g. visceral fat and senescent 
cells (important in arthritis and diabetes); 3. nuclear (epi)mutations caus­
ing cancer; 4. mitochondrial mutations; S. extracellular protein/protein 
cross-links (e.g. leading to high blood pressure); 6. extracellular aggre­
gates (e.g. resulting in amyloid involved in Alzheimer's disease); and 7· in­
tracellular aggregates (e.g. resulting in hardening of the arteries). De Grey 
proposes to remove and repair the damage that has accumulated every ten 
years or so. He does not believe in prevention of damage. His type of ar­
rested senescence is rejuvenation. He expects that in the period between 
2025 and 2040 we will be able to fix the seven problems of senescence (to 
a large extent through genetic interventions and stem cell therapies) and 
that around 2050 'robust human rejuvenation' will be generally accessible. 
He realizes that the first fixes will not be perfect, but they will give us 
time to develop better repair methods. Highly respected biogerontolo­











gists have attacked De Grey's ideas forcefully (Estep et al. 2006; Warner et 
al. 2005). It is important to note, however, that the difference of opinion 
is mainly political, ethical, and related to funding and estimates about 
the speed of future developments, not about the possibility of substantial 
life extension in itself. A last remark to conclude this preliminary sec­
tion: the [US] President's Council on Bioethics has taken 'the possibility 
of extended youth and substantially prolonged lives' very seriously. In its 
2003 report Beyond Therapy (President's Council on Bioethics 2003, 159­
204) the Council warns against substantial life extension as a threat to the 
meaning of human lives. 
Meanings of Life: A Theory 
Before going into arguments on life extension and meanings of life we 
also have to explicate the concept of meanings of life. A useful point of 
departure is social psychologist Roy Baumeister's book Meanings ofLife 
(Baumeister 1991) in which he develops a theory which gives us some 
grip on the elusive concept of a meaningful life. According to Baumeister, 
meaning is about connection. People have a need to put things, actions, 
and projects in a broader context and this need can be subdivided into a 
number of needs for meaning. An important one is the need for purpose. 
The vital thing here is to interpret one's current activities in relation to 
future or possible goals or fulfillments. A second need for meaning is the 
need for moral worth. People want their life to be of positive value and 
their choices to be right and good and morally justifiable. A third need is 
for efficacy, competence or control. People do not only want to have pur­
pose in a life of moral value, they also want a certain capability or power 
to achieve these goals and realize these values. They want to feel free and 
competent and able to make a difference. They do not want life to happen 
to them, they want to direct it at least to some extent, and often people 
prefer the illusion of control over a more realistic sense of powerlessness. 
The last need for meaning mentioned by Baumeister is the need for self­
respect, self-esteem, or self-worth. Humans not only want a life of positive 
moral value, they also want to have worth themselves. They want to find 
some basis for positive self-worth, they want to have some claim on re­
spect, both self-respect and the respect of others. Usually this need takes 
the form offinding an aspect in which one is better than others, a reason 
to be respected by others. But this reason need not always be moral. Al­
though ..elf-worth is often related to a combination of moral worth and 
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efficacy, it is not the same as this combination. Someone who has left his 
or her partner, may feel greater self-worth because of this tough decision 
(it feels better than being rejected and abandoned by the other), but he 
or she may feel guilty at the same time, in doubt about the moral value of 
the act. 
Baumeister's theory has been improved by others. Jan Hein Mooren 
(1998) has argued that a meaningful human life is a life that is sufficiently 
understood as part of a world with a certain structure and causality. Peo­
ple have a need for comprehension. They want to be able to understand 
and explain the world they live in, what happens to them and why they act 
as they do. They want to be able to create a coherent life narrative, to tell 
an intelligible story about their life. They want their new experiences to 
fit their past and to conform to what they know about their environment, 
their world. Through 'interpretive control' the need for comprehension 
can be linked to the need for efficacy. Adri Smaling (unpublished) adds 
a last need for meaning; the need for (comm)unity, which to some extent 
can be seen as the flip side of the need for efficacy. People not only have a 
need for controlling things, but also a need for release, for abandonment, 
they want to let go. They do not want everything to depend on themselves, 
but they also want to be part of something bigger, to feel connected and 
as one with others or the other. Altruism is related to the need for moral 
worth and the need for (comm)unity. 
Baumeister has argued that it is very implausible to think of the mean­
ing of life as one single overarching good thing everything in life connects 
with, completely and eternally. This is what he calls the myth of high­
er meaning. Life is bound to have several meanings and to have trivial, 
meaningless, and unruly fragments as well. Moreover, it often happens 
that meanings of life conflict with each other (Berlin 1991). Life is inescap­
ably characterized by absurdity, conflict, and change. However, human 
beings keep searching for meaning, which is often woven together into 
a connecting narrative, a story to live by (Dresden 1990; McAdams 1997). 
Living your story turns out to be important, even though your life story is 
not your whole life and even though your story has more than one impor­ /i' 
tant plot. Meaning is one of life's principal tools for stability, continuity, 
and identity. 
This theory of a meaningful life is partly based on findings of empirical 
psychology, but it is obvious that a fully fledged theory needs historical, 
sociological and ethical input. Baumeister's conviction that in modern 
Western society the self has become the major base of values (not need­
ing further justification itself) shows this clearly. Baumeister thmks that 
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seeking, knowing, or finding yourself (personal identity), creating your­
self (self-actualization), and self-worth have become mOre important than 
religion, morality and tradition. He also indicates (1991, 127) that in mod­
ern society it is more difficult to satisfy the needs for moral worth and 
purpose than those for efficacy and self-worth. In this context, Charles 
Taylor's Sources of the Self(1992), Anthony Giddens's Modernity and Self­
Identity (Giddens 1991), and Joep Dohmen's Het Leven als kunstwerk (Life 
As a Work ofArt) (2008) raise important philosophical issues about au­
tonomy, authenticity, life politics, the art of living, hypergoods, and tran­
scendence. Moreover, a meaningful life is not equally within everybody's 
reach, and some social circumstances are more favourable for achieving it 
than others. '[I]n many societies that we call advanced, such as the United 
States, whole segments of the population grow up with so much chaos 
and so little order that "planning" is a foreign word' (Hagestad 1996, 208). 
Given all these issues, it is clear that the theory of meanings of life is still 
in its infancy, and that much more empirical, theoretical, and philosophi­
cal research needs to be done. 
An important issue is how a meaningful life relates to the quality of 
life, to happiness, life satisfaction, or subjective well-being (Diener 1984; 
George 2000; 2006; Pavot & Diener 2004; Ryff 1989; Ryff & Singer 1998; 
Veenhoven 1996), and to the mOre objective concept of human dignity as 
proposed in human rights theories or human capabilities theories (Buiten­
weg 2007; Nussbaum 2001; 2006; Nussbaum & Sen 1993; Pogge 2002). In 
this context, Baumeister's analysis of the parenthood paradox, described 
in the following paragraph, is relevant (1991, 160-166). 
A large amount of evidence supports the conclusion that having chil­
dren produces worries and reduces happiness, but in spite of this many 
people want children. The difference between a happy or satisfactory and 
a meaningful life may largely explain the parenthood paradox. However, 
much here depends on the meaning given to the concepts 'happy' and 
'meaningful: Baumeister's parenthood paradox seems to presuppose a he­
donic interpretation of happiness, life satisfaction, and subjective well­
being, as argued for by Ed Diener (1984) and Ruut Veenhoven (1996). Life 
satisfaction, positive affect, and absence of negative affect are central here. 
If, following Carol Ryff (1989), subjective well-being is interpreted eudai­
monically, emphasizing purpose in life and thus 'clearly imposing a defini­
tion of life quality on individuals who mayor may not evaluate their own 
lives on those criteria' (George 2000, 7), the difference between 'well-be­
ing' and 'meaningfulness' becomes smaller. Ryff's eudaimonic subjective 
well-being originally had six dimensions: self-acceptance, purpose in life, 
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personal growth, positive relations with others, environmental mastery, 
and autonomy. After some more empirical work she reduced the relevant 
dimensions to four, of which the first two are primary: purpose in life and 
quality connections to others, and the other two are secondary: positive 
self-regard and mastery (Ryff & Singer 1998). 
To my knowledge little theoretical and empirical research has been 
done to improve Baumeister's theory of 'meanings of life: The alternative 
theory of 'eudaimonic subjective well-being' has turned out to be much 
more fruitful, up to now. Starting from this theory a considerable amount 
of research has been and will be published (see www.midus.wisc.edu). 
However, as indicated above, Ryff's concept of subjective well-being shows 
much overlap with Baumeister's and our theory of a meaningful life. The 
most important remaining difference appears to be our emphasis on the 
need for moral worth. And because in my considered opinion morality 
and ethics posit objective or at least intersubjective norms for relations 
with others, moral worth makes a meaningful life - in the same way as 
human dignity - a more than purely subjective concept. To achieve prog­
ress in the theory of meanings of life interdisciplinary research, which 
combines psychology, philosophy (especially ethics), and other academic 
disciplines such as sociology, history, cultural anthropology, and evolu­
tionary biology, is necessary. 
In the remainder of this article I will indicate a few important con­
siderations around the meanings of life that regard effective substantial 
extension of the human lifespan; a detailed examination of all of these 
considerations is not my purpose here, nor is it even possible. By substan­
tial extension I mean decelerated senescence and arrested senescence as 
outlined earlier on in this chapter. Decelerated senescence is much more 
probable as the scenario for decades to come, but arrested aging certainly 
is an interesting scenario. It cannot be completely ruled out for the long 
run and it is interesting because it forces us to think in new ways about 
what we think most important in our lives and societies. This is important 
even if arrested aging will never happen. 
Life Extension and Sense of Purpose 
A very 'natural' argument in favour of substantial life-extension is that 
in a very long life we will be able to complete important projects we have 
planned and embarked upon (Hagestad 1996). For example, at conferences 
I have met quite a few biogerontologists and philosophers who argued 






that it is unfortunate that when we finally start to understand the topic we 
study, our cognitive abilities begin to dwindle and our death comes near. 
However, a sense of purpose does not depend on finishing our projects. 
When we complete a project or see a long-standing desire fulfilled, this 
will bring a sense of satisfaction and sometimes efficacy, but to experience 
a sense of purpose in life it is necessary that we keep striving for some­
thing in the future, for something that is unachieved but imagined to be 
possible. As every scientist and scholar knows, achieving better knowl­
edge of a subject is possible, but it always opens up new questions we had 
not yet thought of before. Complete knowledge always has the character 
of a receding target. This means that a much longer life will make it pos­
sible to finish larger projects, to plan longer careers, to not only see our 
children and grandchildren grow up but also our great grandchildren. Es­
sentially, however, the situation will not change as far as sense of purpose 
is concerned. 
Authors criticizing substantial life extension often point to loss of 
meaning. Thus, Hans Jonas wrote: 'Perhaps a non-negotiable limit to our 
expected time is necessary for each of us as the incentive to number our 
days and make them count' (Jonas 1985, 19). The objection to life exten­
sion seems to be that, when we have a lot of time to reach our goals, 
reaching these goals becomes meaningless, because we have known all 
along that we would reach them, this year or another. Yet much can be 
said in response to this. What does 'making our days count' exactly mean? 
Horrobin (2005, 14) points out that it is an odd argument to assert that 
people enjoy playing football today and experience no ennui in doing so 
only because they are aware that they cannot do it three centuries hence. 
Perhaps the most fundamental criticism of Jonas's argument is expressed 
by Christine Overall (2004). She states that we should not argue against 
increasing human longevity by reference to the limited parameters set by 
current life expectancies. According to her, this is the fallacy of begging 
the question. When the context changes and life expectancies become 
much longer, our judgment of life's possibilities and meanings will also 
change. Not only will childhood and age be redefined, but concepts like 
schooling, education, marriage, partnership, friendship, sexuality, gen­
der, father, mother, parent, grandparent, family, career, retirement, na­
tionality, and citizenship will also take on other meanings. Together these 
changes will constitute new moral systems, purposes, and contexts for 
meaning. But I think Overall exaggerates. The way we think about human 
fulfillment now, of course, is relevant to our well-considered present-day 
judgments on prolongation of life. I would agree with her, however, if she 
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argued that we ought not to evaluate substantial life extension only by 
reference to the kind of life that we know now. Certainly, a comprehensive 
evaluation of future possibilities requires not just norms, values, facts and 
extrapolations, but also imagination. 
It is a fact, of course, that lives with less than the average life expec­
tancy can be experienced as meaningful. But even if life extension would 
not increase the possibility to lead a meaningful life, it might result in new 
(better?) ways of having a meaningful life, as has happened in the past: 
[T]he increase in life expectancy [since 1900] means that individuals 
now have a greater chance of growing old. In a sense, the course of 
people's lives has become more predictable. People expect to reach a re­
spectable age and they live their lives accordingly. The growing certain­
ties in life have been accompanied by a shift in norms and values. In the 
early twentieth century, people had a more fatalistic approach to life: 
things simply happened, and changes in life unavoidably befell people 
(...) This fatalistic approach to life has been replaced by a more proactive 
attitude, or 'choice biography', the notion that people can shape their 
own lives (Dykstra 2002, 10; see also Hagestad 1996, 208). 
Another round of substantial life extension might cause people to take on 
an even stronger managerial attitude towards life. However, that human )f}I 
lives can be planned towards chosen purposes in the future will remain 
a matter of degree. Human vulnerability remains. A society with more i(expensive) health care technology for its members creates the condi­
tions for more instead of fewer insurance policies and other risk-avert­
ing strategies. New risks (among them corporate and state uncertainties 
transferred to individual citizens, see Dannefer 2000, 270) and the old 
risks that remain, might even become more oppressive and threatening 
because there is more to lose. That is why Aubrey de Grey does not want 
to lecture in dangerous countries and why he thinks that the prevention 
of traffic accidents will be given absolute priority in societies with greatly 
extended life expectancies. 
Life Extension and Efficacy 
Research shows that having a fair amount of control over life's circum­
stances and having a relatively high degree of self-esteem are factors in 
determining a more than average life expectancy (Marmot 2005). So hav­
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ing (a sense of) control is good for longevity. But do control, life extension 
and a much longer life contribute to a more meaningful life? The desire 
for control can go so far as to be self-defeating and counterproductive. 
Furthering longevity might involve such hard and manifold efforts that 
life becomes meaningless rather than meaningful. A body repair every ten 
years, as envisaged by De Grey, is not too big a price to pay for a long and 
healthy life, but when a substantially extended lifespan and health-span 
demands constant attention every day, the gain in years might be offset by 
a loss in quality of life. Medicalization could turn out to be a serious prob­
lem connected with life extension (Porter 1999; Verweij 1999). A good bal­
ance would have to be sought, as otherwise the controlling efforts needed 
for a longer life might start to make human life meaningless (and lives 
experienced as meaningless might tend to become shorter again). 
Life Extension and Moral Worth: Distributive Justice 
An important aspect of a meaningful life is that it can be justified morally, 
and one of the most important moral problems concerning the engineer­
ing of substantial life extension relates to justice. Justice is about the dis­
tribution of (the lack of) things we value. At the beginning of this article I 
distinguished between different kinds of life extension, but I left out one 
very important factor: the 'social gradient' of longevity. Life expectancies 
differ according to social status. Michael Marmot's recent summary starts 
with an illustration from the United States capital: 
If you take the Metro from the southeast of downtown Washington to 
Montgomery County, Maryland, in the suburbs - a distance of about 
14 miles - for each mile traveled life expectancy rises about a year and 
a half. This is the most life-enhancing journey in the world. There's a 
twenty-year gap between poor blacks at one end of the journey (male life 
expectancy fifty-seven), and rich whites at the other (Marmot 2005). 
Such inequalities in life expectancy at birth exist all over the world (Mack­
enbach & Bakker 2003; Marmot 2004). How do we understand these in­
equalities? Marmot's analysis comes down to this. An important determi­
nant of an individual life's longevity is (1) a favourable genetic endowment 
and early life history, but, though important, this is only a small part of 
the story. Other important elements are: (2) living in a country above the 
absolute poverty level - a GDP of about USD $5,000 - above this, level 
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differences in GDP between countries do not matter very much; (3) high 
relative social position (as regards status, employment grade, relative 
wealth and extent of social participation); and (4) high relative freedom, 
autonomy, or control over life's circumstances - in many Western coun­
tries this still means for men especially at work, for women at home. The 
third and fourth factors are connected with the fact that a more equal dis­
tribution of household income in a country seems to be related to a higher 
average life expectancy. The second factor indicates a similar thing, but 
then with reference to a threshold kind of equality between countries. 
In some countries infant and child mortality is still terribly high, while 
the means to do something about it have been known to humanity for 
a long time, which shows that we live in a world full of injustice. What 
counts as injustice depends on the theory of justice that is used. However, 
whether one refers to human rights (Buitenweg 2007), Rawls's theory of 
justice as fairness (Rawls 1999a; 1999b), Dworkin's equality of welfare and 
resources (Dworkin 2000), or Nussbaum's capabilities theory (Nussbaum 
2001; 2006), differences in average life expectancy at birth of forty years 
between countries (Japan and Zimbabwe) and more than twenty years 
for socio-economic groups within countries - differences which can be 
removed and prevented by collective social action - are hard to defend as 
morally acceptable. Now imagine what would happen if in such a world 
substantial life extension became possible through initially very expen­
sive biotechnology such as longevity pharmaceuticals or gene therapy. 
The demand, backed by purchasing power, certainly in the beginning, 
would mainly come from young adults, the better educated, wealthier 
and higher-income individuals and those with higher initial endowments 
of health. Socioeconomic and health inequalities would be amplified. A 
small group of people with an already high life expectancy would have 
access to lifespan and health-span extension, but many less-privileged 
people would not. Surely this is ethically undesirable, is it not? 'The need­
based claims of the worse off to have reasonably long lives have more 
moral weight than the preference-based claims of the better off to have 
longer lives' (Glannon 2001, 167, see also McConnell & Turner 2005, 61 
and Mauron 2005). 
The existence of social injustice can never be a valid reaSon for morally 
objecting to any improvement in the fate of human beings who do not 
belong to the most underprivileged ones. 'If we were to insist that tech­
nological developments of all sorts wait until the world becomes perfectly 
just, there would be absolutely no scientific progress' (Post 2004b, 537, see 
also Harris 2003 and Davis 2004). This is true, but I think one should not 
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stop there. Demanding equality and perfect justice within and between 
countries as a prerequisite to the development of life-extension technol­
ogy is asking too much. Here, as often, 'perfection' would be the enemy of 
the good. The remedy for injustice is not denial of benefits to some with 
no corresponding gain to others, but redistribution (Dworkin 2000,440). 
Not being able to do everything, or enough, should be no excuse for do­
ing nothing. Efforts like the UN Millennium Development Goals are very 
important. It is important before 2015 to try to reduce the proportion of 
people living on less than a dollar a day by half, to reduce the mortality 
rate among children under five by two-thirds, to try to reduce the mater­
nal mortality ratio by three-quarters and to halt and begin to reverse the 
spread of HIV/AIDS and the incidence of malaria and other major diseas­
es (Garrett 2007,32). These are challenging goals, but they are technically 
feasible and mainly depend on political will. In the same vein, ambitious 
but feasible goals could be formulated to do something about the shock­
ing disparities in longevity between and also within countries. Christine 
Overall proposes a qualified prolongevitism (expanding the 'natural' max­
imallifespan) within countries, one that will genuinely be for all, a kind of 
affirmative action in the field of life extension. She writes that increased 
research into conditions and diseases that affect groups of people with 
low life expectancy, like people of colour and poor people, is morally indi­
cated (Overall 2003, 200). However, note that for longer life expectancies 
of less-privileged people more equality of income is more important than 
new achievements in high-tech biomedicine. As highlighted by Marmot, 
only three of the thirty-nine recommendations in the Acheson Report to 
the British government - Inequalities in Health: Report ofan Independent 
Inquiry (1998) - are related to health care. 'The others covered the tax and 
I 
benefit system; education; employment; housing and environment; mo­
bility, transportation, and pollution; and nutrition' (Marmot 2004, 251). 
Reducing health inequalities might both be the ethically indicated and 
the most effective way to substantially extend the (remaining) life expec­
tancies of many people; it will be more effective than biotechnological 
approaches aimed at decelerating or arresting senescence of human be­
ings as a species. Many healthy human years can be gained by this heavily 
neglected form of life extension: more equal longevity. 
One should realize, however, that priorities do not have to be absolute 
and generally allow for compromise. Serious and strenuous attempts to 
tackle the national and global social gradient of longevity certainly do 
not require that biogerontological research into the diseases of the oldest 
old and into the general underlying processes of senescence is stopped 
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completely. As far as international injustice is concerned, one should not 
forget that the numbers of the old and oldest old in developing coun­
tries will also increase rapidly. Already the remaining life expectancy of 
a woman who has managed to reach the age of sixty in Brazil (21 more 
years), India (18 years) and Nigeria (17 years) is not so different from the 
number of years an average sixty-year-old female inhabitant of the Unit­
ed States can expect to add to her life (24 years). The WHO anticipates 
that the per centage of people over sixty living in developing countries 
between now and 2050 will rise from 60 to 85 per cent of the total global 
number (Kalache, Barreto & Keller 2005, 36, see also Aboderin 2006 and 
Kirkwood 1999, 8). In China and India the elderly will outnumber the to­
tal current population of the US by mid-century (Olshansky et al. 2006, 
31). It is possible that understanding the fundamental processes of bio­
logical ageing is the most effective way of fighting age-related diseases 
such as Alzheimer's (Post 2004b). Because of this, because we do not 
really know how to make the distinction between biological processes 
of 'normal' ageing and age-associated diseases, and because this distinc­
tion continues to change, it would be short-sighted to stop fundamen­
tal biogerontological research (Derkx 2006; Izaks & Westendorp 2003; 
Juengst 2004). f 
This whole section about justice relates to the sense of moral worth, 
an important component of a life which is experienced as meaningful. All 
things considered it should be very difficult for human beings to enjoy a 
substantially extended and at the same time meaningful life without con­ I\,i'.'.;.;tributing anything to the fight against ethically unacceptable longevity 
inequalities in the world. 
Life Extension, Subjective Well-Being, and Meanings of Life 
I have already made some remarks about the relation between life-ex­
tension and sense of purpose, but more has to be said. A longitudinal 
survey done in the US showed that people over 64 reported significantly 
lower levels of life purpose than younger adults. In addition, physical and 
emotional health were perceived as decreasing with age, and people over 
74, especially women, rated themselves substantially lower on sense of 
control than younger age groups. At the same time, however, women over 
54 and men over 64 rated their relationships with others more positively 
than younger adults did, and overall life satisfaction of men and women 
over 54 was more positive than that of younger people (Ryff 2006). De­
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spite a decline in many areas, overall subjective well-being is as good, if 
not better, for older people as for their younger counterparts. This has 
been regarded as strange, but socio-emotional selectivity theory shows 
that there need not be a contradiction here: 
The theory maintains that two broad categories of goals shift in im­
portance as a function of perceived time: those concerning the acquisi­
tion of knowledge and those concerning the regulation of feeling states. 
When time is perceived as open-ended, as it typically is in youth, people 
are strongly motivated to pursue information.... In the face of a long 
and nebulous future, even information that is not immediately relevant 
may become so somewhere down the line. In contrast, when time is 
perceived as constrained, as it typically is in later life, people are mo­
tivated to pursue emotional satisfaction. They are more likely to invest 
in sure things, deepen existing relationships, and savor life (Carstensen 
2007,45). 
Not so much a preoccupation with the past but with the present may be 
a sign that a person's life is felt to be coming to an end (see Hagestad 
1996,207). The decisive factor in socio-emotional selectivity theory is not 
chronological age but perceived remaining life expectancy. When condi­
tions create a sense of the fragility of life, for example after the September 
11 attacks in the US, or during the SARS epidemic in Hong Kong, younger 
as well as older people prefer to pursue emotionally meaningful experi­
ences and goals in the short term (Fung & Carstensen 2006). So, what 
does this mean for substantial life extension? It is plausible that with a 
substantially higher life expectancy people will keep making plans and for 
a longer time will have a sense of purpose in life, but they will also pay the 
price of having to wait longer before they reach the state of more positive 
relations with others and higher overall satisfaction with life. When the 
expectations of the longevity of life increase, people will be more inclined 
to keep gathering information that might be useful some time in the fu­
ture and to postpone gratification of emotional needs. However, it is not 
immediately clear what is the better situation. Is it more important to 
have a meaningful life or a happy life? Will later life be more emotionally 
gratifying if one has had a longer period of (successful?) striving for goals 
and fulfillments? Will 'old age' be happier if one has had a longer 'youth'? 
Will it be possible to live longer and at the same time to learn to be 'older 
and wiser' at a relatively early stage? Part of the answers will depend on 
the socially expected life course. 'The life course has become a princi-
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pal cultural connection between individual lives and the larger society 
through an image not only of the good life, but of the timetable according 
to which it should be achieved' (J. Keith and others quoted in Hagestad 
1996,209). 
A Final Issue: Is Life Extension Unnatural? 
Important authors on life extension such as Hans Jonas (1992 ), Leon Kass 
( 2004), Francis Fukuyama (2002), Daniel Callahan (1995), and Bill McKib­
ben (2003) have exhorted us 
to live more or less according to nature, and warn that our efforts to 
depart from what we are will result in new evils that are more perilous 
than old ones. (...) Our focus (...) should be on the acceptance of aging 
rather than on its scientific modification. The intergenerational thrust 
of evolution, by which we are inclined toward parental and social in­
vestment in the hope, energy, and vitality of youth, provides the basis 
for a natural law ethic that requires us all to relinquish youthfulness 
(Post 2oo4b, 536-537). 
It is very easy to dismiss these 'natural law positions' as an untenable de­
ontological stance by pointing out that if substantial life-extension starts 
to occur in nature it begins to be 'natural; or by emphasizing that humans 
have always changed nature (including their own natural features) in the 
course of civilization. More or less the same goes for the religious versions 
of these arguments, referring to a God who has established the natural 
law. That humans should respect the will of God or that they should not 
attempt to play God, runs into similar intellectual difficulties as the ex­
hortation to respect nature, and into additional difficulties as well. Re­
ferring to the will of God is not a very strong argument in a pluralistic 
democratic society that includes atheists and agnostics. 
However, it is possible to discover something important behind these 
arguments from nature or God, even if one rejects the absolute deon­
tological positions and is more inclined towards consequentialist ethics. 
Human nature is not blank, nor completely and always easily malleable. 
It is the result of millions of years of natural selection. Human beings are 
the result of evolution and as such they are very complex organisms with 
many trade-offs involved, referring back to environments of the past. We 
cannot design humans from scratch. Stressing that we ought to be wary 
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of bad unintended consequences is not the same as claiming that nothing 
should be changed. It is possible for a society to opt for a less-than-one­
child-per-family policy to counteract undesirable effects of population­
growth due to increasing old age survival, but will its individual citizens 
accept this policy and live up to it? Human nature is very flexible, but it is 
possible to ask too much of human beings. It seems relevant, for example, 
to consider the emotional implications of a population scenario with 9 bil­
lion people in 2300 with an average life expectancy at birth of about 100 
years, few children and a high proportion of very old people (Basu 2004, 
93). And we should not only be talking about what is possible for human 
beings, individually and as a group. We should also consider what is good 
for them and what makes their lives meaningful. To ask what desires and 
emotions are humanly 'natural' can be translated into a question about 
what desires and emotions are good and proper for human beings to have 
and deserve the opportunity to be acted upon. 
I More discussion about meanings of life is needed. But in individualistic 
'I secular societies people have many different ideas about what constitutes 
a meaningful life, so it will be difficult to reach consensus or even under­
standing about the value of life extension. Part of the difficulty is that in 
modern Western societies it is rather generally accepted that meanings of 
life are a private matter, not something about which to engage in public 
debate. 
The variety of ideas about meanings of life will be very difficult to han­
dle in a democracy, because the differences can be wide and not a matter 
of degree. 'Transhumanists' like Ray Kurzweil (Kurzweil & Grossmann 
2004), Nick Bostrom (2003i 2005), Gregory Stock (2002), and Aubrey de 
Grey (De Grey & Rae 2007) feel that we should not accept biological age­
ing as inevitable. They argue that the fundamental biology of human be­
ings should be changed in order to get rid of death caused by senescence. 
Other thinkers, not only of the natural-law variety, see this as a dangerous 
illusion, holding that the propagation and cultivation of ideas like this 
are very detrimental to the meanings of human lives. This difference in 
worldview is a crucial aspect of the debate on substantial extension of hu­
man life expectancy. Much of what is involved is expressed in these words 
of Michael Lerner: 
[We] need to do the spiritual work as we grow older to accept the inevi­
tability of death rather than acting as though aging and death could be 
avoided if only we had a better technology. The enormous emotional, 
spiritual, and financial cost of trying to hang on to life as long as pos-
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sible (and to look as though we were not aging) is fostered by a market­
place that tries to sell us endless youth. It is also fostered by our cultural 
failure to honor our elders, provide them with real opportunities to 
share their wisdom, and combat the pervasive ageism with its willing­
ness to discard people long before their creative juices have dried up, 
to stigmatize the sexuality of the elderly (...), and to provide little in 
the way of adequately funded and beautifully conceived long-term care 
facilities (Lerner 2006, 308-309). 
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